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Monarchy, Migration and Hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula 
 
JOHN CHALCRAFT 
 
Abstract 
Migrants make up a greater proportion of the workforce in the Arabian 
peninsula than perhaps in any other region of the world. Migration politics, 
however, has been either understudied – in comparative politics and 
conventional economics – or treated by authors influenced by modernization 
theory and Marxism alike in a deterministic manner. Using Antonio Gramsci’s 
concepts of hegemony, historic bloc and alternative hegemony, this paper aims 
to analyse the significance of migration for the changing fate of monarchy in the 
region since 1945. On the basis of primary and secondary sources in Arabic and 
English I argue that migration has played two different roles in the region. In the 
1950s and 1960s, it formed a part of an oppositional bloc challenging monarchy. 
From the 1970s to the 2000s, however, the oppositional bloc dissolved and 
migration became an adjunct rather than a challenge to the ruling order. 
INTRODUCTION 
Historians and social scientists have done remarkably little to connect migration to the 
changing fate of monarchy in recent decades on the Arabian peninsula. The literature 
on monarchy and patrimonial rule – dominated by comparative politics, but including 
some history and anthropology – has almost completely omitted to discuss the 
political significance of migration (Anderson 1991, 2000; Ashton 2008; Ayalon 2000; 
Beblawi 1990; Crystal 1990; Damis 1992; Davidson 2008; Entelis 1976, 1989; 
Halliday 2000; Hammoudi 1997; Huntington 1968; Khalaf 1992, 2000; Kostiner 
2000; Luciani 1990; Maddy-Weitzman 2000; Mahdavy 1970; Okruhlik 1999; Ross 
2001; Shlaim 2007; Waterbury 1970, 1973; Zagorski 2009; Zartman 1987). The 
emphasis has instead been on the ways in which monarchs have overcome the 
dilemmas of modernization and, more sotto voce, the contradictions of capitalism, 
through great-power support, the crafting of states and building of coalitions (using 
rents where possible), and on the way rulers have identified themselves as generous 
father-figures, authentic yet modernizing guardians of national, Arab and Islamic 
traditions and values. The relative lack of attention to migration may be regarded as a 
surprise given the fact that in six of the eight surviving monarchies in the Arab world, 
the workforce is between one-half and nine-tenths foreign.  
On the other hand, the literature on migration to the Gulf – dominated by 
economics – has done surprisingly little to probe the political significance of 
migration. The dominant approach since the 1970s has analysed migrants as 
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‘manpower requirements’ in a story of ‘economic growth’ in which expert planners 
and responsible authorities either succeed or fail in implementing migration policies 
that will guarantee the undistorted operation of the market – while paying due 
attention to local ‘cultural’ and ‘demographic’ concerns (Bhagwati 1984; Birks and 
Sinclair 1980; Fergany 1982; Kapiszeswki 2001; Seccombe 1983, 1987; Seccombe 
and Lawless 1986; Serageldin 1983; Sherbiny 1981, 1984). This approach occludes 
both its own politics and those of migrant ‘manpower’ by making the profoundly 
unequal and consequential control over persons, their livelihoods and social and 
political relations, appear merely as the neutral and technocratic management of 
things. At best, such approaches only inform a conversation about markets and 
growth, which, in some very deliberate sense, is all they purport to do. They have 
done little to illuminate, except as primary sources, the political role played by 
migrants in the changing fate of monarchies in the Gulf (cf. Longva 1997: 2).  
Authors influenced by Marxism have argued that migration has been a way to 
divide and defeat the challenge posed to monarchy by the emergent forces of a 
socialist working class (Disney 1977: 22; Franklin 1985; Halliday 1977a, 1980, 1984; 
Khalaf 1985; Lackner 1978: 194, 197, 216). And scattered references, by writers 
influenced by modernization theory, to the convenience to ruling families of having 
an ‘apolitical’ and ‘transient’ workforce (for example, Davidson 2008) suggest an at 
least implicit account in which foreign and ‘disposable’ migrant workers helped 
reforming patrimonial rulers overcome the dilemmas of modernization. The problem 
with both of these accounts, however, is that they rely on determinist, materialist and 
teleological expectations of who workers are and how they are supposed to behave. 
Migrants are supposed to spring, fully formed, from the socioeconomic base, and then 
enter the political superstructure in order to enact certain anti-monarchical positions. 
Clearly this socioeconomic determinism will not do. 
The literature treating migrants as acculturated subjects, however, and that 
which takes politics more seriously, is growing (Abu Lughod 1985; Choucri 1986; 
Kapiszewski 2001; Khoury 1981; Lackner 1978; Longva 1997; Louër 2008; Russell 
1988, 1989; Russell and Al-Ramadhan 1994; Vitalis 2007; Weiner 1982). The point 
of departure for this paper is best articulated by Longva: ‘[a]n approach that 
recognizes labor migration as an integral part of social life in the region is … urgently 
needed’ (Longva 1997: 2). Further, in order to escape the determinisms of 
modernization theory and materialist Marxism alike, but without rushing headlong 
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into the jaws of linguistic or discursive determinism, the paper makes use of Antonio 
Gramsci’s notions of historic bloc, hegemony and alternative hegemony. The aim is to 
build on existing conversations to develop a distinctive argument about the political 
role of migration in the Arabian peninsula from 1945 to the present.  
The paper argues that migration played two quite different roles depending on 
history and context. On the one hand, in the particular international and regional 
context of the 1950s and 1960s, migration was an element in a serious challenge to 
the rule of beleaguered monarchs in the peninsula. In the decades following 1947–8, 
Arab migrants – especially Palestinians, Egyptians and Yemenis – acted to transmit 
international and regional anti-monarchical pressures. They played a role in ‘the 
revolutionary, Arab nationalist tide which inundated the Gulf and Arab peninsula 
region in the 1950s’ (Al-Naqeeb 1990: 101). Domestically they formed an important 
element in oppositional assemblages, involving renegade princes, disaffected officers, 
merchants, professional and intermediary classes, workers and migrants. These groups 
were stitched together – articulated hegemonically in a way that made diverse social 
elements appear as a unity – in various ways by the ideas of pan-Arabism, Nasserism, 
leftism, statist developmentalism and reformism, and posed a real challenge to the 
ruling families.  
Migration took on a completely different political significance in the greatly 
altered international and regional context of the 1970s–2000s, when it became an 
adjunct rather than a challenge to the resurgent power of patrimonial ruling families in 
the region. In the two decades after 1973, migrants mediated via remittances a new 
international and regional balance in which Gulf monarchs became more powerful 
vis-à-vis increasingly indebted and divided Arab and Third World sending countries. 
Migrants, further, were a transmission belt for structural transformations and ideas 
that undermined the power and hegemony of the formerly radical single-party regimes 
vis-à-vis their monarchic competitors. Domestically, migrants of ever more varied 
national origins were disarticulated from oppositional assemblages with the attrition 
of radical pan-Arabism and leftism and the rise of local, conservative nationalism and 
neoliberalism. Alienated from local allies, understood as a demographic and cultural 
problem, and facing market forces, segregation and exclusion, migrants were now 
only able to lodge protests in corporate-economic terms, and the political challenge to 
monarchies of which they formed a part was defeated. 
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MONARCHY UNDER SIEGE 
In the 1960s, ruling families in the Arabian peninsula, with their patrimonial politics 
‘based primarily on family ties, personal loyalty, and patronage’ (Zagorski 2009: 
441), had strong reasons to feel under siege. True, geopolitical support for monarchs 
had long come from Britain and more recently from the United States, and such 
support was reaffirmed with the British–CIA coup of 1953 in Iran which faced down 
the forces of nationalism, liberal democracy and leftism and re-established the 
Peacock Throne on a more authoritarian basis (Abrahamian 2001). But ‘protection’ 
from the imperialist camp had not saved other monarchs – whether in Egypt in 1952 
or Iraq in 1958 – and it was clear to most that the charge of being a British or 
American puppet could be devastating. Revolutionaries in Oman, for example, were 
inspired by the belief that ‘[King] Feisal [of Saudi Arabia] is [President Lyndon] 
Johnson’s ass’ (cited in Halliday 2002: 384), and the muwahhidun gunmen who 
seized the grand mosque in Mecca in 1979 believed that the Saudi royal family were 
the craven servants of American infidels (Trofimov 2007). Sometimes, moreover, the 
commitment of the British or the Americans to supporting ruling families was not as 
firm as those families themselves might have liked. Arms and resources were usually 
forthcoming, but did even the British and the Americans really believe that the 
monarchs would last? Their left intellectuals certainly did not. Instead, some heralded 
the way combined and uneven capitalism promised anti-monarchist revolution and 
anti-imperialism. Socialism and class politics ‘opened up the possibility of an 
alternative fate for the peoples of the Middle East still under various intense 
oppressions … the radical anti-imperialism developing in the Arabian peninsula 
pointed to a liberated future’ (Halliday 2002: 29). That several copies of Halliday’s 
book were seen in Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal’s office in the 1970s 
implies that these things were noted ‘on high’ (Halliday 2002: 1).  
But more ominously for rulers, even prominent US political scientists on the 
political right and close to power who frowned on instability and popular movements 
were convinced that monarchs worldwide were due to fall. Samuel Huntington, to 
pick the most oft-cited example, reckoned in the 1960s that monarchy would never be 
able to survive the acute ‘king’s dilemma’ it faced: monarchy needed to centralize 
power in order to deliver reform, but this would make ‘difficult or impossible the 
expansion of the power of the traditional polity and the assimilation into it of the new 
groups produced by modernization’. The outlook for these monarchs was ‘bleak’ and 
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the only real questions concerned ‘the scope of the violence of their demise and who 
wields the violence’ (Huntington 1968: 5, 177, 191; cf. Halpern 1963). The British 
diplomatic records for Saudi Arabia emphatically confirm that British officials held 
similar views until 1971, when it was decided that the prospects for monarchical 
survival were improving (Burdett 1997, 2004). 
Beyond the United States and Britain, the picture was bleaker. Certainly the 
geopolitical manoeuvres of the Soviet Union and China were sometimes ambiguous, 
but it is still probably fair to say that the general thrust was anti-monarchical. The 
Communist Party of Iraq, for example, had to swallow many a difficult directive from 
the Kremlin (such as the recognition of Israel in 1948 in the midst of the catastrophic 
dispossession of the Palestinian people), but they were never asked to support the 
Iraqi monarchy. Of course the official line in the world communist movement, as well 
as the ideas that motivated people to become communists, were strongly opposed to 
the feudal, bourgeois or imperialist anachronism that was monarchy, seen as irrelevant 
to or nugatory for liberation, progress and development.  
Elsewhere, the eruption of the Non-Aligned Movement onto the world stage at 
Bandung in 1955 as the embodiment of the political aspirations of newly independent 
Third World nations was just another threat to the sultans of Arabia. None of the 
major figures in the movement – Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Nkrumah of Ghana 
and Tito of Yugoslavia – was a monarch. Third Worldism generally depicted Arabian 
amirs and shaykhs as the old-fashioned, reactionary puppets of neocolonialism, and 
adjuncts of economic dependency and underdevelopment (Khalili 2007; Malley 1996; 
Prashad 2007). 
If anything, the regional stage was even less comforting. In Morocco, the 
monarchy lurched from crisis to crisis in the 1960s and early 1970s (Hudson 1977: 
223; Waterbury 1973). Sultan Muhammad V (ruling 1927-61) seemed to survive 
independence only because France’s decision to deport him in 1953 inadvertently 
worked to cement his nationalist credentials. Jordan’s King Hussein was nearly 
unseated in 1956-7. His dynasty remained under threat until 1961 only to face a 
further crisis in 1970 (Ashton 2008; Shlaim 2007). Could Hussein’s much-remarked 
political skill really be reliably emulated? And these were the success stories. All the 
other Arab monarchs had been besomed into the dustbin of history: King Farouk of 
Egypt in 1952-3, Muhammad VIII al-Amin of Tunisia in 1956-7, the Hashemites of 
Iraq in 1958, the Imam of Yemen in 1962 and King Idriss of Libya in 1969.  
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The republican and revolutionary governments in the region voiced their 
opposition to monarchs loudly, and appeared very much to hold the political initiative 
in terms of their identification with the ascendant forces of the Third World, pan-Arab 
anti-imperial national liberation, economic development, social justice, progress and 
modernization. The officers who put an end to the monarchy in Iraq in 1958 
triumphantly claimed to have ‘liberated the country from the domination of a corrupt 
group which was installed by imperialism to lull the people’. In Egypt, the Free 
Officers declared that the whole nation was ‘unanimous in wishing to see the 
monarchical regime disappear forever’. Closer to home, the Yemeni Revolutionary 
Council which deposed the imam defined the primary goal of the revolution as putting 
‘an end to those things that have blocked all progress in Yemen – tyranny, reaction, 
corrupt government, and the evil system of monarchy’ (quoted in Ayalon 2000: 34). 
These regional governments, which, together with Syria, were increasingly viewed as 
playing key roles on the pan-Arab stage, were ready to give troops, arms, money and 
logistical support to anti-monarchical opposition movements in the peninsula. Thus 
Egypt threw its military weight behind the anti-monarchists in the eight-year civil war 
in North Yemen which began after the revolution of 1962 (Halliday 1980: 215-17), 
and Nasser supported and gave a platform to Gulf opposition movements through 
Sawt al-Arab (‘Voice of the Arabs’), the popular pan-Arab radio station. 
In short, in the regional and international context of the 1950s and 1960s, the 
kings, shaykhs and amirs of the peninsula had many persuasive reasons to peer out 
from their palaces, city-states and desert kingdoms with considerable anxiety about 
their future. It should be no surprise that the Arab migrants – especially Palestinians, 
Egyptians and Yemenis – who flocked to the peninsula after the Second World War 
seemed to, and actually did, transmit external anti-monarchical pressures.  
ARAB MIGRANTS 
After the Second World War, Arab migration to the peninsula greatly increased. Until 
the 1940s, notwithstanding relatively small numbers of Palestinian and Egyptian 
school teachers arriving to work in Kuwait and Bahrain from the late 1920s, ‘most of 
the immigrant labor present in the region … was drawn from the Indian sub-
continent’ (Seccombe and Lawless 1986: 573). This changed during the 1950s and 
1960s. Ironically, perhaps, national independence and the break-up of the British 
empire played an important role. On the one hand, Indian independence in 1947 
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loosened ties to South Asia. On the other hand, the passing of empire in Mandate 
Palestine was the crucial backdrop to the mass dispossession of the Palestinians at the 
hands of Zionist settlers, which resulted in the exile to other Arab states of about 1.5 
million Palestinians (Halliday 1984: 4). The Ba‘thist coup in Baghdad of 1968 and the 
civil war in Yemen – echoes of the break-up of the imperial system – also propelled 
Arabs towards the peninsula monarchies. Moreover, the development and leadership 
imperatives occasioned by national independence were part of the backdrop to the 
development projects that would employ migrants. 
By 1975, 90 per cent of the non-national workforce of Saudi Arabia was 
comprised of Arab migrants. In a country where the total resident population was 
around six million, North Yemenis numbered 280,400, Palestinians 175,000, 
Egyptians 95,000 and South Yemenis 55,000 (Birks and Sinclair 1980: 97, 115). In 
Kuwait, Arab migrants totalled around 400,000 (out of a total resident population of 
about one million) and thus comprised about four-fifths of the total non-national 
workforce in 1975. Almost half of the Arab migrants were Palestinian/Jordanian, and 
most of the rest were either Egyptian, Syrian or Iraqi (Birks and Sinclair 1980: 34, 44, 
48-50; Joukhadar 1980; Russell 1989: 27). Brand points out that ‘appointing 
Palestinians came to be viewed as a national obligation (wajib qawmi)’ (Brand 1988: 
144) during a ‘honeymoon period’ for both communities, who were ‘swept up in the 
Arab nationalist fervor of the time’ (Brand 1988: 124). 
In Bahrain, in 1971, around half the non-national workforce was Arab, the 
majority (two-thirds) of these from Oman (Birks and Sinclair 1980: 158, 168, 171). 
The absolute numbers involved in Qatar were smaller, but still proportionally 
significant. Petroleum Development Qatar recruited Palestinians from the 1950s, and 
Arab migrants comprised just over a quarter of non-nationals, with 
Palestinian/Jordanians and Egyptians being the largest groups (Birks and Sinclair 
1980: 57-8, 70).  
Socioeconomic development plans and associated employment were 
developed later (from the late 1960s onwards) in the United Arab Emirates and Oman 
– but, especially in the early stages, they also employed Arab migrants in large 
numbers. Egyptians and Palestinians were teaching in schools in Dubai in the 1950s 
in smaller numbers. In the UAE in 1975, a quarter (62,000) of all migrant workers 
(251,500) were Arab, the most numerous being Palestinian/Jordanian, Omani and 
Egyptian (Birks and Sinclair 1980: 73, 89). In Oman, almost half the workforce was 
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probably non-national in 1975, an unknown but significant proportion of these being 
Arab (Birks and Sinclair 1980: 177, 186). 
Some Arab migrants were employed in the oil industry – in the 1950s the 
Kuwait Oil Company followed Aramco of Saudi Arabia’s lead and began to recruit 
Palestinian labour (Seccombe and Lawless 1986: 573). But the great majority worked 
in the construction, staffing and maintenance of the physical infrastructure, education, 
health and social services. Such migrants were a key element in the development 
plans of ruling families attempting to secure their rule. 
MIGRANT POLITICS 
Arab migrants were not just manpower; they also brought politics. In Bahrain, the 
relatively few educated Egyptians and migrants from the Mashriq played an indirect 
role by spreading the ideas associated with the round of non-sectarian, nationalist, 
constitutional and labour protest from 1954 to 1956 against British imperialism and 
the ruling Khalifa autocracy (Khuri 1980: 198). Migrants were active in the 
politicized cultural clubs in Bahrain’s principal towns – Muharraq and Manama. Their 
presence here, indeed, reached back to the 1920s, when Egyptians, Syrians and others 
were first employed as teachers and administrators in Bahrain (Al-Mdairis 2004: 13–
14), bringing Arab nationalism, and even strike action, with them (Bahrain 
Government 1986, vol. 2: 28–9). After 1945, Al-Mdairis argues that Arab migrants 
‘played a major role in the development of the political and cultural consciousness of 
[Arab] nationalism in Bahraini society’ along with the demand for a constitution and 
representative institutions (Al-Mdairis 2004: 12). These migrants also played 
important roles in establishing branches of the political parties that already existed in 
the Mashriq. No surprise that the British Adviser, Charles Belgrave, was to be found 
complaining in the 1950s about Egyptian teachers in schools and their ‘dangerous’ 
Nasserism (Al-Mdairis 2004: 14). Arab migrants, along with their activism, were 
accepted in Bahrain and encouraged by pan-Arabists aiming to build solidarity with 
those they saw as their Arab brothers. Some enjoined the abolition of passports for 
Arabs moving around the Arab world (Al-Mdairis 2004: 15-16). The Voice of Bahrain 
urged that ‘The fellow Arab is not the foreigner’ and championed the rights of Arab 
labour in Bahrain (Khuri 1980: 198). Iraqi activists exiled to Bahrain – among others 
– lent their experience in labour organizing to Bahraini nationalists in the 1950s 
(Khalaf 1985: 25).  
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In Kuwait, Arab migrants were more numerous, more active and engaged 
more directly in strikes and protests – including those associated with Suez and the 
Tripartite Aggression in 1956, the United Arab Republic in 1959, the defeat of 1967, 
and even the politics of the Kuwait National Assembly at different points between its 
founding in 1963 and closure in 1976. Arab migrants, especially Palestinians, who 
were often wealthy and took skilled managerial positions, were involved in Kuwait’s 
cultural and political clubs, in student activism, the underground political parties, and 
the formation of unions (Al-Ghazali 2007: 428-33; Al-Mdairis 2004: 22). Notable was 
the influence of the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN), founded at the American 
University of Beirut under Palestinian leadership in the early 1950s, but active in 
Kuwait shortly thereafter with both migrant and Kuwait leadership and participation 
(Lackner 1978: 94). The MAN movement itself played a leading role in labour 
organizing in Kuwait (Brand 1988: 127) – organization assisted by the Palestinian 
members’ ‘experience of labour organization and … progressive political 
consciousness’ (Smith 1984: 172-3). Labour organizing and Arab nationalism 
marched together, where foreign and non-Arab companies – above all the oil 
companies – were attacked for exploiting their Arab labour (Al-Mdairis 2004: 15-16). 
The Palestinians themselves formed labour unions in Kuwait under the auspices of the 
PLO (Brand 1988: 128-9).  
Fatah – the long-dominant faction of the PLO after 1969 – was founded by 
Yasser Arafat and others in the late 1950s in Kuwait. While Fatah (along with the 
PLO more generally) pursued of necessity a policy of ‘non-interference’ in Kuwait 
and other Arab states’ domestic affairs, its form of leadership was revolutionary not 
monarchical. Tolerance and even sponsorship of the PLO in Kuwait by the ruling 
family in order to bolster its pan-Arab credentials was therefore a policy that risked 
unintended anti-monarchic consequences. Factions of the movement such as the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were far less willing to refrain 
from criticisms – at the very least – of Arab governments seen as reactionary, feudal 
and in hock to Western imperialism. 
Further, migration politics played a role in the politics and fortunes of 
Kuwait’s representative assembly. The first Kuwaiti National Assembly was elected 
in 1963, the product of a compromise by the ruling family with merchants seeking a 
say in government. ‘[F]rom the beginning’, writes Weiner, ‘there were sharp political 
cleavages [in the Assembly] between supporters of the Amir and leftist opponents 
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supported by the large Jordanian/ Palestinian immigrant population’ (Weiner 1982: 
23). In 1965, the growing strength in the National Assembly of the Arab nationalist 
bloc led the government to try to ‘pre-empt any tendencies toward political activism 
on the part of migrants by solidifying government control over the entry and 
employment of aliens’ (Russell 1989: 34). But in line with pan-Arab ideals, the 
‘leftwing legal opposition’ continued to press the ruling family ‘to loosen the 
conditions of citizenship’ (Halliday 1984: 6; Russell and Al-Ramadhan 1994: 584). 
Palestinians – often wealthy and highly educated – sought a larger role in Kuwaiti 
affairs. They objected to the amendments of the Kuwait Nationality Law and 
measures in 1965 and 1966 that aimed to augment Kuwaiti nationalist constituencies 
against the Arab nationalist bloc via expanded naturalization of Bedouin who could 
trace their attachment to Kuwait through tribal lines (Russell 1989: 34), while setting 
an upper limit of fifty on the number of aliens that could be naturalized yearly. 
Opponents of the ruling family in the National Assembly launched outspoken attacks 
on the government about the discriminatory policy of naturalizing ‘illiterate’ Bedouin 
while denying citizenship to vast numbers of educated Arabs born in Kuwait (Russell 
1989: 37). In 1967, the unions struck in protest against the government for not giving 
adequate support to front-line Arab states in the war with Israel.  
In 1976, the National Assembly wanted Kuwait’s rulers to take a firmer stand 
on the Palestinian cause with regard to events in Lebanon, opposing the ruling 
family’s call for merely a ceasefire, and passed a resolution condemning the Syrian 
intervention against the Palestinians, leftists and pan-Arabists. The Kuwaiti opposition 
‘was viewed by conservatives as an intrusion of migrants’ political concerns into 
Kuwait’s traditionally neutral stance towards neighboring countries of the region, and 
was directly linked to the dissolution of the Assembly [in 1976]’ (Russell 1989: 37). 
As Weiner has it, members of the Kuwaiti elite were alarmed ‘at the increasing signs 
of militancy among the Palestinians and their Kuwaiti supporters’. In August 1976, 
Amir Sabah prorogued the constitution and suspended the assembly: strikes and 
public meetings were banned, the press was controlled and public opposition to the 
government was ended (Weiner 1982: 23). Ruling family sensitivities to accusations 
by MPs of corruption played an important role in this decision, just as in more recent 
examples of constitutional suspension. But it would seem that the linkages between 
MPs and migrants on pan-Arab and left-leaning issues also played their part. 
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 While the Republican coup d’état on the Nasserist model in North Yemen in 
1962 owed something to the activities of Nasserist Egyptian officers training the 
forces of the soon-to-be deposed imam, migrants were involved in much larger 
numbers in the labour movement and anti-colonial struggle that evicted the British 
from Aden and South Yemen in 1967. The British had recruited North Yemeni 
migrant labour for work in the port of Aden for political reasons – fearing any 
disruption of the social structure in the hinterland of South Yemen itself (Halliday 
2002: 183). Nonetheless, these North Yemeni migrants went on strike in their 
thousands from March 1956 onwards in what became one of the most radical and 
sustained waves of labour protest in the Arab world in the post-war period (Halliday 
2002: 86; Watt 1962). These protests at points paralysed the port and played an 
important role in making the colony ungovernable from the British point of view, 
contributing to the decision to withdraw completely. The Saudi ruling family, fearing 
for their throne, regarded this withdrawal with horror. Faysal complained to the 
British that just when they had closed the door to revolution in North Yemen, the 
British had opened it again in South Yemen (Burdett 2004, vol. 3: 288). 
In the desert kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself, republican, liberal, leftist and 
labour opposition developed in various ways in the Hejaz, the oil-fields of the Eastern 
province and the armed forces. Arab migrants – Palestinian, Yemeni and Egyptian – 
played important roles. In the Hejaz, existing regional and ideological opponents of 
the House of Saud were joined by journalists and politicized elements in the sizeable 
community of Arab migrants – especially Egyptians and Palestinians – who started to 
work in numbers from the late 1940s in Saudi and the Hejaz in the oil industry, 
education, journalism and administration. While clubs and unions were generally 
banned, migrants writing in the press worked to link together pan-Arab consciousness 
and ideas of administrative reform, representative institutions and socioeconomic 
development (Abir 1993: 28-9, 35). Especially between 1958 and 1960, in addition to 
pamphleteering by opposition organizations, the Saudi press – ‘dominated by 
Egyptians and the Hijazi intelligentsia’ – openly defied censorship and frequently 
published articles promoting Arab nationalism – and indirectly attacking the regime 
(Abir 1993: 40). In the 1960s, the Saudi regime made moves to censor and reorient 
the press, deport journalists and reduce numbers of Egyptian teachers, who were 
thought to be importing Arab nationalist ideas (Kapiszewski 2001: 133–44; Lackner 
1978: 192–3). 
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The most important round of worker mobilization (petitions, demonstrations, 
boycotts and strikes) in Saudi history began at Aramco in March 1953 and continued 
until June 1956. Thousands of workers – most of the Aramco workforce – participated 
(Vitalis 2007: 127–93). As elsewhere on the peninsula, workers’ demands combined 
social and economic issues with nationalist, Nasserist, communist and pan-Arab 
politics (Abir 1993: 35; Al-Rasheed 2002: 99-100; Smith 1984: 173). Although 
Vitalis underplays their role, Palestinians, Yemenis and others were involved as 
activists and participants (Halliday 1984: 7; Lackner 1978: 94-5). While arrests, 
imprisonment and deportation may have been in error, and thus cannot serve as an 
entirely accurate guide as to who was engaged in activism, it would seem to be hasty 
to dismiss this evidence completely. Aramco had an intelligence bureau and 
informants in the workforce. The Saudi security services were developing a reputation 
for effectiveness through these decades – at least to judge by the internal comments in 
the British embassy archives. Given that in the 1950s, at least, the Saudis were just as 
likely to deny foreign involvement as to proclaim it, it cannot be said that arrests and 
deportations were always for show, especially when repression was kept quiet. 
Moreover, Aramco opposed some arrests and deportations as they valued their 
Palestinian workers for economic reasons (Smith 1984: 173). Deportations of migrant 
workers from Aramco in November 1953 included ‘three Palestinians, a Bahraini, and 
a naturalized Saudi citizen from Aden … who was stripped of his citizenship before 
being exiled’ (Vitalis 2007: 154-5). By the end of 1954, more than 160 Palestinian 
workers had been arrested and deported; another 100 were arrested in 1955 – for 
‘unauthorized political activity’ (Smith 1984: 173). These Palestinians were suspected 
members of the Parti Populaire Syrien and the Ba‘th Party (Lackner 1978: 193; Vitalis 
2007: 161). The authorities noted ‘tracts in some of the [workers’] rooms’ and the fact 
that ‘the terms and phrases used by the most articulate had Moscow (via Beirut) 
written all over them’ (Vitalis 2007: 152). According to Smith, ‘[d]uring the 
following years the number of Palestinians allowed to work in sensitive installations 
and in the oilfields was reduced considerably’ (Smith 1984: 173; cf. Brand 1988: 
127). 
The third main site of opposition in Saudi Arabia, apart from the Hejaz and 
Al-Hasa, was the army and the air force. There was an attempted coup by a small 
group of Free Officers in 1955, a number of acts of sabotage (such as the explosions 
of November 1966 to February 1967), several assassination attempts on leading 
13 
 
members of the royal family, and at least one other serious coup attempt in 1969. In 
1967, members of the armed forces and the police were accused of organizing, joining 
in or at the very least failing to prevent demonstrations and crowd actions. Certainly 
the British assessment from the mid-1950s until 1971 was that a coup was a definite 
possibility, and even a likelihood (Burdett 1997, 2004). The point to note here is that 
those who volunteered for, or were persuaded or coerced into carrying out, acts of 
sabotage seem often to have been Palestinian or Yemeni migrants. For example, an 
arms cache was discovered hidden in the king’s palace in Riyadh in April 1957. A 
Palestinian confessed to having secreted the arms on the instructions of the Egyptian 
military attaché, Lt. Col. Khashaba (Vitalis 2007: 189). Sketchy details in the British 
documents of a plot to kill Faisal in January 1965 involved Palestinians (Burdett 
1997, vol. 5: 23). The bombs of November 1966 to February 1967 were initially 
blamed on Egyptian-trained Yemenis, and seventeen Yemenis were executed publicly 
in March 1967 (Burdett 2004, vol 2: 507-19). The Saudis arrested and beat a number 
of Palestinians in the wake of a few explosions on 2 June 1967 at American targets in 
Jedda (Burdett 2004, vol 2: 847, 857). Finally, South Yemenis from the South 
Yemeni National Liberation Front and the Hadramaut, Egyptian military instructors 
and at least one Lebanese were among those arrested during the clampdown following 
the coup attempt of 1969 (Burdett 2004, vol. 4: 4ff, vol. 5: 59-64).  
PAN-ARABISM AND DEVELOPMENT 
Migration as an idea, and migrants themselves as a social group, were linked 
materially and affectively to pan-Arabism. The idea that the borders of the Gulf States 
had been fixed artificially by the colonial powers to dominate an Arab nation divided 
into statelets (dawliyyat) was a central artefact of pan-Arab ideology attractive to 
many in the 1950s and 1960s. Some form of unity, it was held, would enable the Arab 
nation to achieve liberation from colonial divide and rule and economic dependency, 
to punch its weight on the world stage and to reverse the catastrophic expulsion of the 
Palestinians in 1948. Migration was bound up with this pan-Arabism. It was 
imperative that Arabs should be able to migrate to live and work in any ‘region’ of the 
Arab homeland without restriction or discrimination. Many in the peninsula were 
profoundly attached to the idea that new arrivals from the Arab world should be 
welcomed as brothers. They were not even viewed as ‘international migrants’, as 
Western commentators called them, but instead as Arabs from different parts of the 
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homeland. Restriction and discrimination transgressed the pressing need for political 
unity in the face of colonial divide and rule; offended against the principle that 
friendship, brotherhood and cooperation should characterize relations between Arabs; 
and weakened the very forms of cultural exchange and solidarity that free movement 
was intended to promote. Iraq’s open borders to Arab labour in the 1970s were 
intended to burnish that country’s (not always perfect) pan-Arab credentials.  
Some went further to argue that the inclusive and egalitarian movement of 
labour was an important element in the economic development of the Arab nation. For 
Arab nationalists such as the Saudi official Abdallah al-Tariqi, who played an 
important role in the founding of OPEC, but who was exiled in the early 1960s 
(Vitalis 2007: 133-4), oil wealth represented an opportunity whereby Arab states with 
different endowments in population, natural resources and capital could cooperate 
with one another and complement one another’s strengths, in an overall project 
involving not the distribution of rents, but the ‘expansion of the productive base of the 
economy through industrialization and the diversification of sources of income’ (Al-
Naqeeb 1990: 83, 101) in an enlarged regional bloc vital for escaping dependency and 
subordination. For the sending Arab countries to receive the full economic benefit of 
movement across regional borders, a number of voices argued that the receiving 
countries should not discriminate in socioeconomic terms against their fellow Arabs. 
This would restrict opportunities for migrants, lower remittances, and diminish 
migrants’ ability to acquire skills in the receiving countries and/or bring them back to 
the sending countries. Likewise, for the receiving countries, discrimination and 
restriction were inimical to socioeconomic development, for they would only create a 
class of unproductive rentiers in the oil-rich states, who could rely on expatriates to do 
all the productive and menial labour (Sayigh 1972: 293–4, 298–9). ‘True reform’, the 
Kuwaiti academic Shamlan Alessa wrote, ‘and more efficiency in the bureaucracy 
cannot occur unless there is equality of treatment and pay for all workers, regardless 
of country of origin’ (Alessa 1981: 55). These ideas served to identify (meaning both 
to give content to, and to link together) the interests and aspirations of Arab migrants 
with those of local groups in the peninsula. Under the banner of pan-Arabism, locals 
and migrants identified themselves as ‘brothers’ with similar interests. These 
‘brothers’ found themselves in opposition to dynasts pursuing rentierism, local 
nationalism and exclusion.  
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MONARCHY RESURGENT 
As has been widely attested, the six monarchies of the Arabian peninsula overcame 
the opposition that beset them. By the 1990s, they were more secure and stable 
internationally and domestically than ever before. Most would probably assent to the 
general and rather vague view that the presence of an apolitical and transient 
expatriate population has played some role in the new dispensation, although 
remarkably few have actually paid systematic attention to how this worked, or 
addressed the puzzle of how migration politics could be so transformed. This paper 
argues that between the 1970s and the 2000s, migrants’ role changed fundamentally. 
In a changed international and regional context, migrants were unstitched from 
oppositional, regional and domestic assemblages that were themselves unravelling; 
meanwhile, they were riveted into a resurgent ruling historic bloc through violence, 
mass expulsion, segregation and selection on the one hand, and neoliberalism and 
local nationalism on the other. By the 1990s, migrants had become an adjunct rather 
than a challenge to monarchy. 
 The international and regional context changed fundamentally during these 
decades. Throughout the period, the United States and Britain continued to offer 
significant geopolitical support to monarchies in the region, the difference being that 
the United States was increasingly powerful internationally, and after 1991 became 
the world’s only superpower with a major military presence in the Persian Gulf to 
boot. What changed also was the increasing confidence in, or indifference to, the 
survival of monarchs displayed by cultural elites in Europe and the USA. Socialist 
critique was heard less and less. New analyses enumerated in a rather top-down 
fashion all the surprising functional advantages or techniques that monarchy was said 
to possess or wield to crush opponents and/or co-opt opposition. The theory of the 
rentier state, which started out very much as a leftist critique of the nugatory 
economic effects of rentierism, became, with the demise of this kind of 
developmentalist economics, a rather elitist and determinist explanation for the power 
of monarchs to repress or co-opt. (Arguably the literature treating oil resources as a 
major cause of state breakdown, civil war, conflict and instability (Fearon 2005; 
Kaldor and Said 2007) should have driven another nail into cruder versions of this 
determinism.) Neoliberal economists either bracketed politics as a market distortion, 
or offered their consultancy services to the ruling families, or both. Towards the 
political right, and among those mostly closely identified with US and Israeli 
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geopolitical interests, monarchy was increasingly applauded as ‘politically balanced, 
economically developmental, yet traditional and socioculturally integrative’ (Kostiner 
2000: 10). By the 1990s, an emergent human rights critique aside, opposition to Gulf 
monarchy in the United States and Britain was carried on less in the universities and 
more at the popular level, and less in terms of secular left critique and more through 
neo-Orientalist, tabloid tropes about ‘dodgy Arab sheikhs’. 
 Elsewhere on the international stage, formerly threatening geopolitical and 
ideological forces disappeared. The Non-Aligned Movement ran out of steam, fatally 
split over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and steadily lost its 
revolutionary appeal. The USSR broke up in 1991. China was engaged in forms of 
neoliberal market reform from the late 1970s. Regionally, pan-Arab unity schemes 
failed to bear lasting fruit, and the Arab radical republics were crushingly defeated at 
the hands of Israel in 1967. If the nakba of 1948 was a hammer blow to the lustre of 
monarchs, the naksa of 1967 was crushing for the reputation and appeal of the 
revolutionary states. Sadat’s October ‘victory’ in 1973 was very much in the name of 
Egyptian national interests rather than those of Arabs and Palestinians. And whereas 
the turn towards what came to be known as Washington Consensus economics 
involved a coup d’état in Chile (1973), Sadat’s Egypt inaugurated without any such 
coercion an economic liberalization (or infitah, literally ‘opening’) that marked a clear 
break with Nasserism. Further, by signing a separate peace with Israel in 1978–9, 
Egypt broke ranks with the Arab world, abandoning the Palestinians to their fate. 
Syrian national interests governed, and were seen to govern its intervention in 
Lebanon in 1976 against Palestinians, leftists and pan-Arabists. On the domestic 
stage, the republics, weighed down with high energy prices and debt, compared 
extremely unfavourably with the Gulf monarchies, boosted by the quadrupling in the 
oil price in 1973, in terms of delivering physical and social infrastructure and raised 
disposable incomes to their national populations. Opposition movements in the 
peninsula were now severed from international material or affective support, and 
oppositional assemblages in the peninsula could no longer be stitched together by 
pan-Arabism, developmentalism and regional radicalism because these ideas were 
comprehensively losing their lustre. 
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MIGRATION POLITICS 
In this greatly altered context, migration into the oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council from the formerly radical republics became a potent symbol of 
the changing balance of power and wealth, and transmitted ideas and practices to the 
poorer states that undermined the hegemony of pan-Arabism, Nasserism and leftist 
developmentalism, and promoted the neoliberal dispensation (Halliday 1984: 3). The 
regional governments that had formerly held the progressive initiative, and appeared 
almost to lay siege to the peninsula in political terms, approached the Gulf monarchs 
in matters of migration as subordinates, increasingly spoke the language of market 
forces, and mostly competed with each other to send the cheapest, most obedient and 
hard-working labour force (Halliday 1984: 10). Pan-Arab migration had been seen as 
a way to break the bonds of dependency; it now became, through remittances sent 
home to cover indebted governments’ spiralling energy bills and balance of payments 
crises, a sign and mediator of a powerful new form of dependency – that of the 
formerly radical republics on their monarchical ‘elder brothers’ (Alnasrawi 1991: 
155-66).  
Halliday argued that return migration encouraged ‘the spread of capitalist 
relations into the poorer developing countries affected by the oil boom’ (Halliday 
1980: 226). Certainly, the World Bank and other USA-sponsored international 
development agencies discovered (in the 1970s) the entrepreneurial virtues of the 
‘informal sector’ (Elyachar 2005), itself very much a creature of the tens of billions of 
dollars in remittances that Gulf migrants sent to many newly minted ‘developing 
countries’ in the Arab world and beyond (Harik and Sullivan 1992; Ibrahim 1982). 
Migrants themselves were supposed to be, and sometimes aspired to be, the micro-
entrepreneurs so lauded in neoliberal economics. The reality seems more to be that 
skills useful for sending countries were not learned in menial jobs in the Gulf, and 
remittances drove up inflation, encouraged imports, and were spent on survival and 
privatized consumption often centred on the nuclear family. Regardless, migration 
drove a wedge into statist developmentalism and organized national labour, and acted 
to reinforce the very patterns of dependency that market theories centred on economic 
growth claimed they would reverse. Instead of the mutually beneficial cooperation 
between oil-rich and population-rich countries envisaged by pan-Arabism, these years 
witnessed ‘increased inequality and deterioration in the productive and human 
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resources of the Arab world … between the oil-rich and population-rich states’ 
(Halliday 1984: 3). 
RE-COMPOSITION AND DIVERSIFICATION 
On the domestic stage, migrants were simultaneously unstitched from their place in 
oppositional assemblages, which were themselves unravelling, and linked to a 
resurgent dominant bloc led locally by the ruling families. This process of political 
alienation was based above all on the re-composition and diversification of the 
migrant workforce, new forms of segregation and control, the attrition of radicalism, 
and the rise of local nationalism and neoliberalism.  
The re-composition of the migrant workforce in the GCC monarchies between 
the 1970s and the 1990s drove a coach and horses through the material and affective 
links that had bound migrants through pan-Arabism to allies in the receiving country. 
The central features of this were the turn to Asian labour from the mid-1970s 
(Choucri 1986); the growing restrictions on Palestinian labour in the 1970s, followed 
by the mass expulsions of Palestinian and Yemeni labour from Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia in 1991-2; and policies of ‘diversification’ thereafter.  
 There were old precedents for the political manipulation of the national 
composition of the migrant workforce in the Persian Gulf in general, and the use of 
South Asian labour to this end in particular. In Bahrain in the late 1930s, the British 
viewed Iranian workers as reinforcing an Iranian claim to sovereignty there, and 
hence both the British and the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), in the words 
of the BAPCO representative at the time, endeavoured ‘in every way to cut down the 
proportion of that [Persian] nationality’ and to employ Indians instead, even though 
Iranians were cheaper and easier to procure (Seccombe 1983: 6-7). Bahrain, 
moreover, had long restricted the employment of Palestinian migrants, in part for 
political reasons (Weiner 1982: 28). Bahrain, therefore, had a longer experience of the 
ways in which Indian and other migrants, unlike Arabs, were severed from allies in 
the host population. As Franklin puts it, ‘[b]ecause most foreigners in Bahrain are 
non-Arab, Arab nationalism does not cut across the distinction between national and 
expatriate as it does in Kuwait. Alliances are unlikely and foreigners lack a Bahraini 
audience for any complaints about conditions’ (Franklin 1985: 12). In Oman, the 
preference for Asian labour over Arab for political reasons was also well known: 
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The [Omani] government is relatively suspicious of other Arabs: Egyptians have 
been brought in as teachers and civil servants, but the main sources of unskilled 
labor have been Pakistan and India, with whom Oman has long-standing economic 
links. The Baluchistan area of Pakistan has traditionally supplied soldiers for the 
Sultan of Oman’s army, and today many unskilled workers in Oman are Baluchi 
peasants. (Halliday 1977b: 10) 
It was nothing particularly new, in principle, that ruling families in the 
peninsula looked to Asian workers in the 1970s as a measure to head off challenges to 
their rule. Certainly, Arab labour exporters could not fully meet the sky-rocketing 
demand for labour, and to be sure, there was a dose of ‘bungling and [a] planning 
void’ (Al-Naqeeb 1980: 86), but to reduce the turn to Asian labour to either this or 
‘market forces’ and objective ‘manpower requirements’ is indefensible, not least 
because the very demand for labour itself did not stem from the oil sector, but in part 
from political decisions to allocate oil revenue to labour-intensive construction and 
maintenance of physical and social infrastructure, decisions which were in turn 
designed to win the consent of populations thirsty for what was seen as 
modernization. Moreover, Gulf country resource, skill and population endowments 
might have suggested to many an economist a capital-intensive rather than a labour-
intensive development path in any case. ‘Lifestyle’ and status-oriented decisions to 
employ numerous maids, gardeners, drivers and other servants are also not simply 
matters of economic or labour market necessity but linked to social relations of 
distinction and stigma. Closer to the point here: 
Asians had a distinct political advantage: Asian workers were unlikely to make 
claims for citizenship. Asians were alien and could continue to remain 
disenfranchised. They were regarded as more likely to be passive observers of 
political processes rather than as potential activists or claimants on social services 
and other benefits of citizenship. (Choucri 1986: 252) 
Not only were the workers themselves more easily alienated from politics, in 
no small measure because of language barriers, but they came without intra-Arab and 
regional entanglements. It was thought that the political repercussions of expelling 
Asians, for example, were much smaller than those of expelling Arabs (Weiner 1982: 
12). Asian labour, simply put, was ‘less politically menacing’ for the ruling families 
(Halliday 1984: 5; Kapiszewski 2006: 6-7; Weiner 1982: 28) and ‘removed [migrants] 
from the currents of Arab nationalism and Islamism’ (Humphrey 1993: 7). Moreover, 
some middle-class migrants from South Asia undoubtedly had political concerns of 
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their own that actually worked in support of monarchical rule: they were anxious ‘that 
some day they [might] share the fate of the Indian trading and business communities 
of East Africa. Indeed, many of the Indian merchants in Oman and Dubai once ran 
businesses in Uganda, Tanzania, Zanzibar, and Kenya’ (Weiner 1982: 9). This meant 
that these wealthy migrants feared populism and supported monarchy as the guarantor 
of a segmented society, where ‘[s]ociety’s diversity, rather than its uniformity, is a 
virtue’, and national unity is specifically avoided in the service of monarchical rule 
(cf. Kostiner 2000: 4-5; Elias 1983). By 1985, the percentage of migrants in the GCC 
countries accounted for by Arabs had fallen to 56 per cent (from 72 per cent in 1975). 
Contrariwise, non-Arabs had constituted only 12 per cent of all workers in the Gulf in 
1970, but by 1985 Asians comprised some 63 per cent of the Gulf workforce 
(Kapiszewski 2006: 7). 
The two countries where the re-composition of the resident population was 
most violent and far-reaching were those which had received the largest numbers of 
Arab migrants, and which had experienced the most political opposition to monarchy 
from migration politics. In Kuwait, the turn to Asian labour in the 1970s was in part 
aimed at defusing what were largely expressions of Arab nationalist concerns by 
changing the composition of the immigrant population. Certainly in the 1970s, 
‘Jordanians and Palestinians were the only group that experience[d] reductions in 
rates of immigration across all sectors’ (Russell 1989: 36-7). Efforts to deport, 
imprison or execute Palestinian or Yemeni radicals had been pursued for years in 
Saudi Arabia, and Asian labour was increasingly recruited. But the real change came 
with the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. In Kuwait, 
The invasion, the subsequent war, and its aftermath accomplished by force what 
policies could only aim to do incrementally: they dramatically altered the 
composition of Kuwait’s population and provided an unprecedented opportunity for 
the country to rethink radically the role of migrants in its society. (Russell and Al-
Ramadhan 1994: 569) 
Yasser Arafat, in a bid for popularity, had declared the support of the PLO for Iraq, 
which had touted its 1980 invasion of Iran in pan-Arab terms, and linked its invasion 
of Kuwait rhetorically to the Arab and Palestinian cause. And while most Kuwaiti 
nationals observed a general strike in protest at the occupation, they considered the 
fact that many migrants did not to be a terrible betrayal of their generous and 
charitable host nation, the ‘pearl of the Gulf’ (Russell and Al-Ramadhan 1994: 581). 
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Lurid stories circulated, moreover, regarding the collaboration of Palestinians with the 
Iraqi occupiers. For many Kuwaitis under occupation any support for Iraq and its 
dictator was ludicrously offensive, and some 300,000-400,000 Palestinians were 
expelled from the country during 1991-2. Yemen also ‘attempted to remain officially 
neutral’ (Okruhlik and Conge 1997: 559), and Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia paid 
the price, the occasion acting as a ‘catalyst’ (Okruhlik and Conge 1997: 562) for the 
Saudi authorities effectively to force some 750,000 to 1 million Yemenis to leave in 
the few months following September 1990 (Hartmann 1995; Sadowski 1991). The re-
composition of the migrant population was indeed dramatic. In Saudi Arabia the 
percentage of Arabs in the foreign population fell from 91 per cent in 1975 to 33 per 
cent in 2004; in Kuwait ‘the decline was from 80 per cent in 1975 to 30 per cent in 
2003’ (Kapiszewski 2006: 8).  
 The mass expulsions of 1990–1 were both a symptom and a cause of the 
profound disarticulation of migrants to the Gulf from any larger alternative 
hegemony: a symptom because the migrants themselves, once an important element in 
local politics, were completely unable to organize any resistance to their devastating 
expulsion. Appeals to nationals in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia ‘to pressure their 
governments to reverse the decision’ were impossible or doomed, in spite of long 
years of residency, contact and cooperation. Regional governments were unable or 
unwilling to step in. Indeed, on the Arab stage, there was ‘barely a ripple of political 
consequences’ (Gause 1993: 161–2). In some ways, the straightforward expulsion of 
Arab migrants from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was simply an overdue proof that any 
connection between migrants and regional or domestic radicalism had been 
terminated. As Gause wrote at the time: ‘[f]oreign workers pose no threat to the Gulf 
regimes’, and their ‘incapacity’ was definitively brought home by the ‘Gulf crisis’ 
(Gause 1993: 161). 
 But these expulsions were a cause of further disarticulation. Not only did they 
remove potential or actual political activists from the scene, they emboldened ruling 
families to state openly and formalize as policy what had previously been harder to 
formulate explicitly and implement because of the need at the very least to pay lip-
service to pan-Arab ideals. Whereas it had been common, even until the 1980s, for 
‘leaders of Gulf countries [to] speak [in unlikely fashion] of their preference for 
migrants from Arab neighbors’ (Weiner 1982: 28), the need to maintain this public 
22 
 
position was broken by the occupation and its aftermath. As Russell and Al-
Ramadhan conclude, in Kuwait after 1991: 
Most significantly, the ministry for the first time openly expressed the view that the 
composition of the migrant population should consider nationality and ethnicity to 
prevent any one group from controlling the labour market. (Russell and Al-Ramadhan 
1994: 580) 
What had long been the stuff of innuendo in Kuwaiti politics was now openly 
declared, and policies of ‘diversification’ were publicly endorsed and implemented. 
The beginnings of de facto diversification policies had been noted during the 1980s 
(Choucri 1986: 262–3, 266). But after 1990, it was clear that the question for ruling 
families was not how to reduce the proportion of Arab migrants and increase the 
proportion of South and South-East Asians, for the resistance of Arab migrants had 
been, and had been seen to have been, definitively broken. Instead, the question was 
now how to ensure that no one group could ascend to any position that might allow it 
either to articulate itself to an oppositional bloc, or to initiate an alternative leadership 
project of its own. Segmenting the resident population and labour force by nationality 
and ethnicity was one way to achieve this goal. 
SEGREGATION AND ROTATION 
Disarticulation proceeded not only by the national and ethnic re-composition and 
diversification of the residential and working population, but also through the 
introduction of more developed forms of geographical, workplace and legal 
segregation and rotation designed to minimize the possibility of political, economic, 
cultural or social links being forged between migrants and the indigenous population. 
First, many of the development projects inaugurated in the 1970s were located in 
enclaves at some distance from existing urban centres, minimizing contact between 
the migrant workers who built them and nationals. Enclave industrial areas initiated in 
the 1970s, including Shuaiba (in Kuwait), Umm Said (Qatar), Jebel Ali (Dubai), 
Ruwais (Abu Dhabi), Yenbo and Jubail (Saudi Arabia), were all on desert sites away 
from major centres of population (Birks and Sinclair 1980: 151).  
Second, a new system of ‘self-sufficient’ contracting begun in 1976 greatly 
reduced the kinds of social and economic linkages that a large migrant worker 
population otherwise tended to create with nationals. Under this ‘turn-key’ system: 
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Contractors who bring all the labour they need with them, build and provide all the 
facilities necessary for these workers, and take the workers back after the completion 
of the contract, are given preference. (Lackner 1978: 194) 
The system ensured that workers were severed ‘both from the indigenous population 
and from other countries, and from any danger of political ”infection”’ (Disney 1977: 
24). It also enforced their end-of-contract departure, something the authorities had 
conspicuously failed to achieve, for example, regarding the construction of the 
aluminium plant for ALBA in Bahrain which had not been done on an enclave or self-
sufficient basis (Birks and Sinclair 1980: 151). Thus contracts to Japanese, Taiwanese 
and South Korean firms increased, such as that involving 5,000 Korean workers for a 
$1-billion harbour project in Jubail in Saudi Arabia, managed by Hyundai (Disney 
1977: 23; Kapiszewski 2006: 7; Lackner 1978: 194). 
Finally, segregation and rotation were now backed by new legal and 
administrative measures to supplement the already formidable panoply of controls 
denying nationality, political freedoms and social rights to migrants (Khalaf 1992: 72) 
– controls policed by the sanction of summary deportation. In the UAE, for example, 
‘[t]he government devised a new law [the Federal Labour Law of 1980] that requires 
foreign workers to leave the country for six months before changing jobs’. This 
measure was designed to prevent the ‘trouble’ that the presence of unemployed 
migrants might provoke and shore up the system of rotation (Choucri 1986: 263; 
Winckler 2000: 246). Far from exposing themselves to regional anti-monarchical 
pressures, therefore, the ruling families through segregation and rotation aimed to 
acquire their modern infrastructure through foreigners who would show up, do the job 
and disappear. These measures, together with re-composition and diversification, 
were a formidable force in preventing migrants from forging political linkages with 
local allies. By barring assimilation, rulers kept the population of patronage claimants 
low, increasing per capita the amount of patronage to be dispensed, and thus 
enhancing its political impact. As Khalaf has it, ‘[t]he state, personified by the ruling 
family … has produced in the eyes of its subjects an image of a paternalistic, all-
powerful, all-providing, and all-giving father’ (Khalaf 1992: 64). This image and 
practice were far easier to sustain where the recipients of such paternalism were two 
or three times less numerous than they might otherwise have been. 
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LOCAL NATIONALISM 
Pan-Arabism was completely incapable of identifying the interests of allies in the 
national population with Indians, Pakistanis, Filipinas, South Koreans, Sri Lankans 
and others who were non-Arabic-speaking aliens, seen as strange in culture, colour 
and manners, foreign to the common Arab and Islamic history of the region and 
decidedly outside the bounds of the Arab nation. Bandung and Third Worldism may 
have inspired many, Nasser may have sponsored the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity 
Organization, and there was of course a potentially internationalist dimension in the 
more class-based (and less pan-Arab) socialism that appeared among vanguardist 
movements inside and outside the Gulf after the Arab failure of 1967 (Halliday 2002), 
but these elements were not dominant. On the contrary, the guardians of pan-Arabism 
were threatened by the turn to Asian labour, and tended to write of(f) Asian migrants 
in negative and sometimes racist language (Fergany 1983). The very hegemonic terms 
which had stitched migrants into a previous oppositional assemblage maintained their 
attraction even as the composition of the migrant population changed, and thus were 
instrumental in the non-development of new oppositional forms of articulation.  
This severance was made permanent, however, when the tropes of pan-
Arabism were mapped onto and started inadvertently to reinforce the language of 
local nationalism. When it came to ‘Asians’, pan-Arabist and local nationalist 
languages marched in lock step. Bahraini nationalist complaints against Indian 
monopolies of skilled work, for example, were virtually indistinguishable from the 
grievances lodged by their pan-Arab counterparts. Ironically, local nationalism drew 
succour from pan-Arabism, and with the regional attrition of the latter, it was the 
former that emerged victorious.  
An analogous slippage morphed socialism into nationalism. The newly 
declared class-based positions of the Omani liberation movement, for example, led it 
not to internationalism but towards a position close to local Omani nationalism. ‘In 
Oman’, writes Halliday, ‘the promotion of migration is seen by political opponents of 
the regime [the banned People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman] as a means of 
avoiding the creation of an indigenous working class.’ The PFLO also published 
around this time the programme of a National Committee for Oman Workers, calling 
for limitations on the import of foreign labour (Halliday 1984: 6). Such movements 
were unwilling or unable to organize among Asian migrants – and their appeals to 
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working-class solidarity turned out to be segmented on local, nationalist lines: they 
were for Omani workers. 
 Of course migration had long acted as a lightning rod for local politicization 
on nationalist lines. In 1936 in Kuwait, the British Political Representative reckoned 
that ‘an influx of Indians would be liable to lead to trouble’ among the local 
population (Seccombe 1983: 14), and in July 1951, in Qatar, workers at Petroleum 
Development Qatar went on strike demanding the dismissal of 150 Dhofaris working 
for the company. In both cases, however, protests were understood to spell trouble for 
local rulers who were identified with British imperialism in general and Indian 
subjects in particular. In Kuwait, the British feared ‘discontent with the sheikh’s rule’ 
and proposed to limit the number of Indians being allowed in (Seccombe 1983: 14). In 
the case of Qatar, ‘[t]he British, fearing that this could get out of hand and undermine 
the Sheikh’s position, arranged for the evacuation of the Dhofeiri workers, and later 
thirty-seven Dhofeiri members of the Police Force resigned’ (Seccombe 1983: 12). 
Nationalist mobilization in these cases was seen as threatening to the ruling family.  
The difference regarding more recent decades is that nationalist mobilization 
has – with the retreat of the British from the Gulf – been turned to monarchical 
advantage. With the attrition of radicalism and pan-Arabism, local nationalism was re-
articulated in a conservative direction. Ruling families and their allies have invented 
and made use of cultural traditions, nationalism, cultural authenticity and ‘traditional’ 
values – such as the ‘invention of camel culture’ in the UAE – in order to identify 
themselves as the guardians of authentic Arab values and traditions, and thus bolster 
the ‘dynastic political structure’ (Khalaf 2000: 244; see also Khalaf 1992). In Kuwait, 
local nationalists sought to preserve the ‘traditional’ ideological bases of Kuwaiti 
identity: ‘loyalty to the patriarchal leadership of the monarch and adherence to the 
principle that anyone who was not a member of one of the original tribes is an alien 
with no legitimate claims on the rights or prerogatives of tribal membership’ (Russell 
1989: 31). In this view, migrants, Arab and non-Arab, were seen as outsiders and 
competitors in the labour market. Local nationalism, suitably re-articulated in 
conservative terms, could serve shaykhly rule. Its mobilization – against migrants or 
otherwise – did not necessarily spell trouble for rulers, but operated in important ways 
to stitch together their dominant bloc. 
 This re-articulation set the stage for a new hegemonic insistence on and 
particular definition of the double threat posed by migrants. First, migrants were said 
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to be threatening because they made nationals a ‘minority in their own country’. This 
characterization of the threat was heavily dependent on the attrition of pan-Arabism, 
which was more expansive in the definition of who was indigenous; on the attrition of 
leftist political or economic critique, which went well beyond demography; and on the 
complete closure of any route to citizenship or nationality, which ensured that 
foreigners would stay foreigners and ‘locals’ remain a minority. Second, again and 
again, migrants were said to be threatening – by rulers and subjects alike – because 
they might change the much-cherished traditions, customs and values of the Gulf 
countries. As Abd al-Rahman al-Dirham from the Qatari Ministry of Labour said in 
1982: ‘Our social customs are threatened by foreigners’ (cited in Kapiszewski 2006: 
8). In short, the monarchic, conservative, nationalist dispensation was buttressed by 
the notion that migrants posed a demographic and cultural threat to the Gulf countries. 
As long as nationalist anxieties about migrants were channelled into these hegemonic 
terms, they were a force which helped the dominant bloc, led locally by the ruling 
families, to cohere. As Nelida Fuccaro writes, ‘[i]t is beyond doubt … that the 
political, economic and social segregation experienced by “guest” workers in 
contemporary Gulf cities forms one of the core tenets underpinning national 
consensus’ (Fuccaro 2008: 3–4). 
 Nationalization policies, ostensibly intended to replace the foreign workforce 
with suitably trained nationals, had their origins in the economic slowdown attendant 
on falling oil revenues in the 1980s. The slowdown created discontent, triggered a 
search for scapegoats, and stoked the fires of local nationalism. One of the main goals 
of Saudi’s Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1985–90) was ostensibly to reduce 
the number of foreigners in the kingdom by 1.2 million. Oman imposed restrictions on 
certain occupational categories in 1987. A Bahraini programme was initiated in 1989 
(Winckler 2000: 246). But given that for more than a quarter of a century 
nationalization policies have been almost completely unsuccessful, in that the foreign 
proportion of the workforce has only increased (Winckler 2000: 246–8, 251–2), it 
makes sense to question whether the ostensible aim of these programmes is the only 
matter at stake. If it were, then why would these failed policies be continually re-
implemented? It seems plausible instead to view these programmes at least partly in 
the light of the hegemonic functions they serve. Perhaps they in some way work to 
win the consent of the dominant bloc and that of various subaltern social groups on 
the national stage. Certainly when nationalization policies threatened widespread 
27 
 
interests, such as the legislation in Kuwait restricting according to wealth the number 
of foreign maids that households could employ, an outcry followed and the law was 
quickly rescinded. It may be that nationalization programmes, and the flurry of 
conferences, panels, lectures, press articles and discussion that surrounds them, while 
making little difference to the composition of the workforce, do repeatedly affirm the 
unity of nationals against foreigners, ingrain the interpellation of migrants as 
demographic and cultural threats, and provide an important justification for the 
patronage-enhancing policy of the rotation of ‘guest-worker’ migrants: if migrants are 
supposedly to be replaced, sooner or later, by nationals, there need be no provision for 
their assimilation.  
NEOLIBERALISM 
The hegemonic fabric of the ruling bloc was woven together, finally, both 
internationally and domestically, with a neoliberalism heavily identified with US 
geopolitical interests, where the USA, its military presence and dominance affirmed 
after 1991, was supposed to represent the ‘guardian of market forces in the Gulf’ 
(Gause 1993: 195). Neoliberalism played a crucial role in severing migrants from the 
old oppositional bloc, while linking them to the new ruling dispensation.  
The manpower planning assumptions associated with a gathering Washington 
Consensus, and implicit (and explicit) in numerous World Bank publications, 
consultancy reports and academic tracts (Bhagwati 1984; Birks and Sinclair 1980; 
Fergany 1982; Kapiszeswki 2001; Seccombe 1983, 1987; Seccombe and Lawless 
1986; Serageldin 1983; Sherbiny 1981, 1984), were fundamentally at odds with the 
statist and developmentalist economics associated with radical pan-Arabism. Whereas 
the aim of the developmentalists had been a diversified project of productive and 
regionally balanced industrialization and economic development linked to the strength 
of the Arab nation, the aim of neoliberal economics was national ‘economic growth’ 
measured by gross domestic product. This formulation was thoroughly wedded to 
local nationalism. Whereas the developmentalists had insisted that development 
necessarily implied an inclusionary and egalitarian policy with regard to Arab 
migrants, this kind of ‘politics’ was irrelevant to neoliberal consultants, who were 
interested only in whether the national state was creating the conditions for the 
undistorted operation of supply and demand in the labour market. It was precisely at 
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this neoliberal formulation that Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal was taking 
aim when he observed in 1984 how disheartening it was to see that 
Many of the decision-makers involved with problems of manpower migration would 
rather relegate their resolution to the non-human invisible hand of the market forces 
than put up with implications and complications that can ensue from viewing such 
problems from a ‘human’ or at least a regional socio-political [read pan-Arab] 
perspective. (Bin Talal 1984: 612) 
No wonder, perhaps, that Bin Talal, questioning here the sacred script of the market, 
was eventually considered unsuitable to rule Jordan. But for ruling families in the 
Gulf the language of neoliberalism was congenial: it enabled a view of migration in 
apparently apolitical, non-pan-Arab and local nationalist terms.  
With regard to ‘expatriates’ and ‘economic growth’, the new economists 
operated with a very simple assumption based on World Bank manpower planning 
models: ‘[t]he tougher the population policy, the greater the reduction of future 
economic growth’ (Sherbiny 1984: 655). However dubious the economic sense of a 
prescription that totally ignored the question of productivity per head, the point for my 
purposes here is that neoliberal economists told Gulf rulers that the more migrants 
they allowed to their shores, the higher the economic growth they could expect. This 
was a policy prescription enacted from on high, not a ‘free market’ force on the 
ground that prevented Gulf rulers in spite of their best intentions from nationalizing 
the workforce, as some assume (Kapiszewski 2006: 7–9). Further, given that local 
rulers sought to retain the power of patronage by keeping their national populations 
small, but to deliver economic growth to win consent and insure themselves against 
the vagaries of the oil market, the implication for migration policy was clear. They 
should allow as many migrants as possible to work in their territories, while 
minimizing costs (such as unfavourable ‘dependency rates’) and excluding migrants 
from the benefits of nationality as far as possible. The thinking here was the exact 
opposite of the developmentalist prescriptions on inclusion and non-discrimination, 
and totally ignored their critique of rentierism and exploitation, which implied far-
reaching socio-political change. In complete contrast, neoliberalism delivered, under 
the circumstances, a powerful prescription for the maintenance of the status quo 
through exclusion, segregation and discrimination.  
These assumptions could be readily internalized by important national sectors 
in the Gulf. Who did not want to see economic growth? Or, more to the point, who, 
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from householders to businessmen, wanted to be told that they could not import 
cheap, abundant and menial labour? At the same time, few wanted to see their slice of 
the oil-rent pie cut more thinly by policies of assimilation, and so nationals had a 
stake in the segregation and exclusion of migrants – a self-interested view that was 
authorized by the individualistic neoliberal vision. Neoliberalism, further, offered a 
view of migrants as faceless, maximizing and even opportunistic individuals who 
chose to come to the Gulf because that was where they could make the most money 
(Davidson 2008: 187). This view was a potent solvent of an identification of national 
with migrant interests, and vice versa.  
STRIKES AND PROTESTS 
Even under harsh conditions of exclusion, segregation, state violence and deportation, 
and bereft of allies in the receiving country, or meaningful support from sending 
governments, migrants of virtually all nationalities have continued to hold a strong 
sense of grievance about pay, conditions and exclusion. As a Pakistani taxi-driver told 
me with some feeling in April 2009 in Dubai: ‘We are social slaves here!’ Indeed, 
migrants have organized protests from the 1970s to the present. From the Korean 
strikes in Saudi Arabia in 1977, to clashes of Indians with their employers in Oman in 
1978 (Halliday 1984: 7; Weiner 1982: 21–2), to the mass protests of Bangladeshi 
cleaners in Kuwait in 2005, and the new rounds of protest in the Gulf more generally 
since that time, migrants have continued to interpret their condition and try to change 
it for the better. But these strikes and protests, in stark contrast to those in which 
migrants were involved in the 1950s and 1960s, have put forward only economic-
corporate demands. Indeed, many protests have involved only desperate rearguard 
actions by workers to obtain wages promised to them in contracts but never paid. 
These protests have not been identified with the larger politics of any rising 
alternative hegemony. They have ceased, therefore, for the time being, to be part of 
any broad-based political challenge to ruling families of the GCC.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has sketched out a way in which migration can be written into the analysis 
of the changing fate of monarchy on the Arabian peninsula. I have argued that 
migration played a role in both the challenge to, and the consolidation of, family rule. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, migrants, especially Arabs, were identified with oppositional 
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assemblages associated with pan-Arabism and republicanism and posed a challenge to 
patrimonial and monarchical rule. From the 1970s onwards, in a completely changed 
international and regional context, however, migrants were severed from this rising 
opposition, and forcefully connected to the interests of the ruling, patrimonial bloc. 
This was chiefly effected, on the domestic stage, through the re-composition and 
diversification of the workforce; through exclusivist and sometimes violent policies of 
mass expulsion, segregation and rotation; and through the attrition of leftist pan-
Arabism, and the rise of a closed and conservative local nationalism on the one hand, 
and the ‘savage god’ (Davis 2001) of the free market on the other. By the 1990s, 
migrants posed no real threat to monarchies; far from being an element in any 
opposition, they had, at least for the time being, become a presupposition and a prop 
of the ruling bloc itself. Migration has indeed been ‘an integral part of the social life 
in the region’, and not just an ‘epiphenomenon of the labour market’ (Longva 1997: 
2). This paper has aimed to point to some of the political dimensions of this by 
showing how migrants have both challenged and consolidated monarchical rule on the 
peninsula. 
Two points are worth underlining. First, this analysis avoids the strong 
tendencies to teleology, materialism and determinism of modernization theory on the 
one hand, and of Marxism on the other. Monarchs did not via migration overcome an 
inevitable ‘king’s dilemma’, or fragment a socialist working class, because the 
dilemmas of modernization and the rise of working-class socialism were not and are 
not inevitable or automatic. Much depended instead on the (de)construction of 
hegemony and alternative hegemony. No inherent telos prevailed; history, context and 
contingency mattered; and there was real scope for the role of ideas in identifying 
diverse interests.  
Second, the argument aims to illustrate how in comparative politics the 
meaning and effect of a given factor – in this case migration – is not constant and 
stable. The political world depicted here is not a clock-like mechanism comprised of 
levers and springs, cogs and hands (dependent and independent variables), with each 
having assigned or predictable effects, or operating as constant or even probabilistic 
causes (Almond and Genco 1977). Instead the effect of migration, and the meaning, 
form and politics of migration itself, varied fundamentally (although not in an 
endlessly fluid or random way) according to history, context and the (re)construction 
of hegemony.  
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The foregoing implies, finally, that the present state of migrant political 
disarticulation may not last. It is perfectly possible that in the coming years an 
oppositional politics linking the interests, ideas and aspirations of various groups – 
second- and even third-generation migrants (often professionals) excluded from 
citizenship, exploited workers, those in marriages between nationals and non-
nationals, bidun groups and disaffected nationals, for example – will emerge to 
challenge the status quo anew. 
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